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“Voice” and “Address” in Literary Theory
William J. Kennedy
One of Walter Ong’s major interests has been the history of the 
rhetorical tradition in the West and its impact on literary forms. In recent 
years that interest has faced a powerful challenge from the theoretical 
advances of deconstruction. On the face of it, no approach to rhetoric 
or literature could be more different from Walter Ong’s than that of 
deconstruction. In juxtaposing these contrary approaches, I wish to 
look at both from within, to examine their concerns, to understand their 
usefulness. Jacques Derrida describes the deconstructive approach as 
one that is free from method: “The fi rst gesture of this departure and 
this deconstruction, although subject to a certain historical necessity, 
cannot be given methodological or logical intraorbitary assurances” 
(Derrida 1976:162). Deconstruction nonetheless partakes of method 
and systematic discovery. In the words of one of its foremost literary 
theorists, Paul de Man, it teaches that “truth is the recognition of the 
systematic character of a certain kind of error” (1979:17). Walter Ong’s 
own studies have focused on methods and systems of thought, and many 
have explored the particular rhetorical system of Petrus Ramus and his 
followers. In this essay I will argue that the rhetorical assumptions of 
deconstruction share one of the central weaknesses of Ramus’ system. 
The weakness is to reduce the rhetorical presence of voice and address 
to an emotional affect, to subordinate it to the suppositious materiality 
of a fi gure or trope.
Contrary to the allegations of many literary critics hostile to 
deconstruction, the latter’s chief problem is not that it fi nds no meaning 
in human discourse, for often its highly resourceful, deeply pressured 
readings fi nd more meaning than a given text might seem to bear. Its 
chief problem is that it locates all meaning in reifi ed textuality, in the 
material substratum of language and
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discourse, especially their written forms, at the signifi cant expense of 
voice and address. The materiality of the word implies its rootedness in 
time and space with the concomitant notions of presence and absence. 
One major difference between the approaches of Ong and deconstruction 
stems from an opposition between presence and absence in the concept 
of the verbal signifi er.
For Walter Ong, presence entails a “double and interlocking 
dialectic”: “A word can live only while actually issuing from the 
interior, physical and psychic, of the living individual. As soon as it 
has passed to the exterior, it perishes. . . . On the other hand, in so far 
as words are found within us, they are destined for exteriorization. . . . 
In so far as we speak to ourselves in any way, others are capable of 
sharing our thoughts” (1962:50). For Ong and for most of Western 
philosophy, presence requires an admission of the otherness of others, 
a confi rmation of their difference from the self. Presence acquires 
meaning by situating two separate entities in relation to each other. For 
deconstruction, however, presence entails a suppression of difference, 
or, to use Derrida’s word, différance, a participial noun that subsumes 
differing and deferring, division and displacement, distance and delay. 
“That phenomenon, that presumed suppression of différance, that lived 
reduction of the opacity of the signifi er, are the origin of what is called 
presence. That which is not subjected to the process of différance is 
present” (Derrida 1976:166). Writing, not speaking, affords the best 
model for the working of language, because in writing both the speaker 
and the referent are absent. Deconstruction explores absence as the 
condition of language. It explores the void that separates words from 
things, meaning from reference, speakers from audiences, all at the 
possible expense of rhetorical address to effect shared communication.
It is important to qualify this expense as “possible” because 
Derrida himself denies usurping rhetorical voice and address or 
privileging writing and absence over speech and presence: “It has 
never been a question of opposing a graphocentrism to a logocentrism, 
nor, in general, any center to any other center” (Derrida 1981b:12). 
Nonetheless, the effect on voice and address is the same. Deconstruction 
ignores, often at its own peril, the power of the subtext to center voice 
and address. The concept of the subtext, at least in modern usage, owes 
much to the dynamics of live theater. “Subtext” is Stanislavski’s term 
for any gestures, sounds, inner or outer movements, auditory or tactile 
sensations
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that lie behind and beneath the words of a text: “It is the manifest, 
the inwardly felt expression of a human being in a part, which fl ows 
uninterruptedly beneath the words of the text, giving them life and a 
basis for existing. . . . The words come from the author, the subtext from 
the actor” (Stanislavski 1949:108-9). In rhetoric, and certainly in rhetoric 
as the Western tradition has understood it from antiquity through the 
Renaissance, various subtextual strategies of voice and address enforce 
a centering role in spoken and written discourse.
Though sometimes riddled with inconsistency, these terms 
“voice” and “address” offer important resources for rhetorical criticism 
and literary theory (see Kennedy 1978). They designate a frame of 
reference that emphasizes some dimensions of rhetorical meaning 
and suppresses others. In literary texts this frame acts on local fi gures 
and tropes to generate new levels of meaning. It can transpose the 
medium of discourse—language—so that its semantic stability depends 
upon a bond between speaker and audience. A historical awareness of 
concepts associated with voice and address may help to unravel some 
misunderstandings.
In English the term “voice” enters rhetorical theory circuitously. 
Its primary reference to vocal sound as the vehicle of human utterance 
dates to at least the fourteenth century. Modern rhetoricians, however, 
use the term in a highly metonymic sense that attributes the quality 
or tone of a speaking voice to the character or ethos of its individual 
speaker. This metonymic meaning derives from classical rhetoric with 
its technical treatment of vox or pronuntiatio (delivery) as a separate act 
of composition. Here classical theory sometimes urges the speaker to 
impersonate several voices mimetically.
Greek rhetoricians, for example, designate prosopopoeia (= 
Latin fi ctio personae, the impersonation of a fi ctive voice) and ethopoie 
(= Latin notatio, the impersonation of another’s voice) as forms of 
direct quotation. Latin rhetoricians subsume these forms in the concept 
of sermocinatio, a fi gure that attempts to render mimetic dialogue or 
monologue. Quintilian, for example, lists such fi gurae orationis as 
simulatio, exclamatio, and libera vox (licentia) to fashion a distinctive 
voice for free and open discourse (Butler 1920-22:9.2.26).
The history of the term “address” is more complicated. The 
word enters English as a substantive only after long use as a verb. In the 
fourteenth century it means “to straighten” or “to direct”;
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hence in the fi fteenth century Caxton employs it in the transitive 
sense of directing one’s speech to another.  In the eighteenth 
century Pope uses it in the  intransitive sense of speaking directly 
to another.  A more restricted usage occurs  in  George  Campbell’s 
Philosophy  of  Rhetoric  (1776),  where the noun “address” implies 
a command of one’s attention.  Thus Campbell speaks of rhetoric as 
a discourse affecting the faculties of understanding, imagination, 
passion, and will. Each faculty requires a particular “kind of
address’ that formal rhetoric proposes to study (1963:2).
This interest in voice and address originates in classical theory. 
In Plato’s Phaedrus, for example, Socrates privileges the rhetorical role 
of address when he asserts the importance of knowing one’s audience: 
“Since it is the function of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is 
to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul” (Hamilton and 
Cairns 1961:271d). In “Plato’s Pharmacy,” an essay on this dialogue 
in Dissemination, Jacques Derrida traces Plato’s association of writing 
with the word pharmakon that ambivalently signifi es both “medicine’ 
and “poison.” Derrida concludes that “if logos is already a penetrating 
supplement, then isn’t Socrates, ‘he who does not write,’ also a master 
of the pharmakon?” (1981a:117). As Derrida shows, “the nakedness 
of the pharmakon, the blunt bare voice (psilos logos), carries with it 
a certain mastery in the dialogue’ (1981a:120). Contrary to Derrida’s 
understanding, however, Plato shows over and over that speakers listen 
to their own voices while their audiences speak to their own selves, 
so that even in written dialogue mastery does not fl ow in a one-way 
direction. Derrida suspends that situation.
Aristotle recognized a dialectical interaction of voice and address 
between speakers and audiences in his Rhetoric. There he associates the 
role of voice with the act of address when he directs both toward the 
audience as the end of discourse: “That which is persuasive is persuasive 
in reference to some one” (Freese 1926:1356.b.11). The character of the 
audience determines what voice the speaker appropriates: “All men are 
willing to listen to speeches which harmonize with their own character” 
(1390.a.16). Later rhetoricians describe many techniques that enforce 
this dialectic between voice and address. The pseudo-Ciceronian 
Rhetorica ad Herennium (84 BC) designates fi gures of thought like 
effi ctio (character portrayal) and sermocinatio (direct speech) (Caplan 
1954:4.63-65) as stylistic means towards the creation of
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voice, and fi gures of diction like apostrophe and interrogatio (4.22) as 
stylistic varieties of address. Quintilian expands the list in his Institutio 
oratoria (AD 94). He considers ironia, which the audience understands 
by reference to the speaker’s voice (Butler 1920-22:8.6.54), and adds 
exclamatio, prosopopoeia, and “all those expressions that are especially 
striking and most effective in stirring the emotions of the audience” 
(9.2.24-29).
From the beginning rhetorical theory interacts with literary 
theory. In The Republic, for example, Socrates distinguishes among 
literary genres by voice: “There is one kind of poetry and taletelling 
which works wholly through imitation [in several voices], tragedy and 
comedy, and another which employs the recital of the poet himself [in one 
voice], best exemplifi ed in the dithyramb, and there is again that which 
employs both, in epic poetry and in many other places” (Hamilton and 
Cairns 1961:394c). Aristotle echoes Plato when he discusses genre in 
his Poetics (Fyfe 1927:1448.a.2). Drama entails the mimetic creation of 
different voices for each character without the intrusion of the author’s 
voice. Narrative (apaggellonta), on the other hand allows several 
options: to speak in one’s own voice, or in an assumed fi ctive voice 
or mixture of voices that imitate the speech of various characters. The 
second of these options—to speak in an assumed fi ctive voice—subtly 
modifi es the notion of genres other than drama or narrative. For the lyric 
it allows the poetic speaker to relinquish his or her own voice altogether 
and to speak in an imaginative, fi ctively dramatized voice not his or 
her own. From this assumption proceeds the idea of a fi ctive persona in 
lyric poetry and dramatic monologue, and it has a long history. Often 
the fi ctive persona addresses an equally fi ctive audience. Longinus, for 
example, illuminates this function of voice and address in his On Literary 
Excellence (AD 80). Figures like apostrophe, adjuration, anticipation 
and concealment, questions and answers, and asyndeton (chs. 16-
19) provoke a kind of address. By deviating from the conventional 
grammatical order, they challenge the audience to work towards a fuller, 
richer understanding of meaning. Special polyptota include hortatory 
appeals to the reader in direct address (ch. 26) and dramatic changes in 
the speaker’s voice (ch. 27). They enable poets in all genres to achieve
strikingly distinctive styles.
For many moderns all poetic voices are fi ctive. Friedrich 
Nietzsche, for example, anticipates Derrida by insisting upon the
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facticity of the speaking “I,” “the only truly existent and eternal self 
resting at the basis of things” (1967:50). Nietzsche wholly dissociates 
the speaking “I” from the subjective voice of the poet: “Throughout the 
entire range of art we demand fi rst of all the conquest of the subjective, 
redemption from the ‘ego,’ and the silencing of the individual will and 
desire; indeed, we fi nd it impossible to believe in any truly artistic 
production, however insignifi cant, if it is without objectivity, without 
pure contemplation devoid of interest” (1967:48). For Nietzsche the 
means of objectifying the “I” is to fi ctionalize it, to divorce it entirely 
from the author’s identity, to fashion it as a fi ctive voice. In that sense, 
then, all poetic voices are or should be factitious verbal structures free 
from merely contingent associations with individual beings.
The historical path from Nietzsche’s formulation to post-
structuralist theory that explodes the stability of the speaking “I” is 
complex. It is suffi cient to indicate two quite different approaches that 
both anticipate some of deconstruction’s claims and attempt to refute 
them. One is Benedetto Croce’s complaint in his Aesthetics that modern 
rhetoric has degenerated into mere taxonomic refi nement, a theory of 
elocution and beautiful speech that accumulates insights without system 
in a play of empty forms. Croce complains that this dessicated rhetoric 
refl ects a mechanistic “prejudice that the reality of language lies in 
isolated and combinable words, not in living discourse, in expressive 
organisms rationally indivisible” (1909:151). The impoverished rhetoric 
that Croce describes prophetically suggests the structuralist taxonomies 
of fi gures and tropes that deconstruction proposes to overgo. Croce, 
however, argues that no rhetoric can move ahead by reifying language 
as deconstruction does.
An alternative approach pursues the claims of the Russian linguist 
V. N. Vološinov (or, as some scholars claim, Mikhail Bakhtin) about the 
social nature of language. In every text an implied listener functions “as 
an immanent participant in the aesthetic event,” determining the form 
of the text from within as a participant who “exists in the poet’s voice 
as the basic tone and intonation of that voice whether the poet himself 
intends this or not” (Vološinov 1976:114). Like Croce, Vološinov 
validates the roles of voice and address in a broadly social context. 
Unlike structuralists and deconstructionists, however, he refuses to enter 
the devocalized, silent fi eld of mental space cultivated by many
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systems of thought since the sixteenth century. Vološinov’s dialogic 
imagination construes all discourse as a living exchange of voice and 
address.
Prospect might profi t from retrospect, and retrospect shows that 
Renaissance rhetoric plays a crucial role in shaping modern sensibility. 
On the one hand, it increasingly construes fi gures, tropes, and other 
elocutionary devices as deviations from ordinary meaning rather than as 
intensifi ers of deeper meaning. On the other, it pays decreasing attention 
to voice and address as frames for discourse. Renaissance rhetoric 
redistributes the classical emphasis on voice and address. George 
of Trebizond (1395-1472), for example, celebrates the intensifying 
functions of voice and address in his Rhetoricorum libri V (Venice, 
1434), the fi rst complete rhetorical treatise of the Renaissance. There 
George treats rhetoric as an enactment of dialogue, “a civil science in 
which, with as much agreement of the audience as possible, we speak on 
civic questions” (1538:5). He devotes three books to topics of inventio 
and a fourth book to their dispositio, where the exordium “prepares the 
audience for listening” (9) and the peroratio allows the speaker “to stir 
the audience’s emotions as much as possible” (18). In the fi fth book he 
discusses elocutio partly as a matter of fi gures and tropes but mostly 
as a matter of stylistic qualities or “ideas” like magnitude, vehemence, 
and gravity. These “ideas” that George appropriates from Hermogenes 
enhance the fabrications of a projected voice that moves audiences.
As Walter Ong has shown (1958), conceptions about rhetoric 
change profoundly as print technology overtakes the sixteenth century. 
Rhetoric shifts its attention from oral-aural performance towards the 
apprehension of thought in spatial, diagrammatic, or otherwise visual 
analogues. In his De inventione dialectica (1479, published 1515), 
Rudolph Agricola (1444-85) compares the speaker or rhetorician to an 
artist: he works “like a painter who shows how something swollen or 
hollow is expressed with drawn lines, or what color renders shade or 
light” (159). Just as fi gures or shapes and colors or shades constitute 
a painter’s vocabulary, so material fi gures of speech and colors of 
expression constitute a rhetorician’s vocabulary: “A picture is a silent 
poem, a poem is a talking picture” (166). Like George of Trebizond, 
Agricola designates the exordium and peroration for direct appeals to 
the audience, but he warns that such appeals must observe the laws of 
decorum. He derives these laws from Horatian literary theory and its 
concept of
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decorum: “From ignorance of this principle one errs not only in life but 
often in poetry and speeches as well” (idem). The speaker must hold in 
check the resources of voice and address, subdue their emotive force, 
restrain their free play of idea and feeling.
Just as decorum in Agricola tends towards a fl attening of style, so 
the rhetorical reform instituted in the Dialecticae institutiones (1543) of 
Petrus Ramus (1515-72) fl attens the structure of composition. Like our 
deconstructionists, Ramus privileges writing over speech as an effective 
form of communication. The priority of writing to speech becomes a 
key issue. For modern deconstructionists writing is “prior” to speaking 
in a paradigmatic metaphysical sense. Writing typifi es the lag inherent 
in any signifying act, and thus in all language, through its absence of a 
signatory and a referent. “Writing is the name of these two absences” 
(Derrida 1976:41). As a model of différance, writing provides a model 
for language in general. “Language is a possibility founded on the 
general possibility of writing” (Derrida 1976:52). For Ramus, writing 
is “prior” to speech—and privileged over it—in both a temporal and 
a pragmatic sense: “The practice of writing occurs prior to speech in 
nature and time” (1543:521). With this claim Ramus offers standard 
advice about writing an argument before delivering it as a speech. The 
reason is that a writer has more latitude than a speaker to dispose an 
argument, to select and heighten its best parts. Certainly Ramus’ claim 
that writing is “prior. . . in time” argues for conventional rhetorical 
practice. The claim that it is “prior. . . in nature,” however, argues for a 
new logical method.
Logic and rhetoric merge in rhetorical inventio. Among 
techniques for invention that Ramus proposes is imitatio, the technique 
of imitating earlier texts: “The fi rst and easiest method of writing is 
imitation that prudently selects what it wishes to imitate” (idem). So far 
Ramus is asserting the classical and Renaissance practice of copia that 
Erasmus explains so well: “Who could speak more tersely than he who 
has ready at hand an extensive array of words and fi gures from which 
he can immediately select what is most suitable for conciseness?” (King 
and Rix 1963:15). With Ramus, however, the imitative copy entails 
endless repetitions in a vast intertextual space where echoes bounce 
impersonally off each other. As Walter Ong states the case, “At the heart 
of the Ramist enterprise is the drive to tie down words themselves, rather 
than other representations, in simple
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geometrical patterns. Words are believed to be recalcitrant insofar as 
they derive from a world of sound, voices, cries; the Ramist ambition is 
to neutralize this connection by processing what is of itself nonspatial in 
order to reduce it to space in the starkest way possible” (1958:89). This 
reduction throws into bold relief the material substratum of language.
Ramus’ idea of imitation also points toward the material 
substratum. Imitation entails surrendering one’s own personal voice and 
sense of an audience, at least until one fi nds an authentic voice. Ramus 
defi nes the problem by (ironically enough) echoing Cicero’s topos of 
infl uence as a sunburn: “When we feel ourselves colored by the virtues 
of others (as it happens to those who walk in the sun), then writing and 
speech depart from imitation and struggle with themselves” (1964:53R). 
Unlike earlier Renaissance humanists—notably Poliziano, Ermolaio 
Barbaro, and Erasmus, all of whom construe imitation as a point of 
departure for original composition—Ramus confi nes the writer within 
the materiality of the imitative frame. He offers no practical advice to 
distinguish between heuristic imitation and slavish copy. He can embrace 
only an intertextual world of depersonalized models that have lost their 
own subtextual powers of voice and address.
Post-structuralist theory oddly recalls some of these issues in 
our own time. True, Ramus is referring to the practical teaching of 
composition while post-structuralist theory is usually responding to a 
second order of thought about philosophical problems. Among literary 
critics, however, Paul de Man has written extensively about rhetorical 
theory and practice, and for other critics he has set an infl uential example 
of neutralizing voice by locating it in the material ground of metaphor: 
“The term voice, even when used in a grammatical terminology as when 
we speak of the passive or interrogative voice, is, of course, a metaphor 
inferring by analogy the intent of the subject from the structure of the 
predicate. . . . And this subject-metaphor is, in its turn, open to the kind 
of deconstruction to the second degree, the rhetorical deconstruction 
of psycholinguistics” (1979:18-19). The philosophical warrant for this 
position substantiates the power of rhetoric while it puts into question 
the stability of intentional acts. Jacques Derrida, for example, brackets 
conscious intentionality when he discusses the phenomenological 
assumption of being as present in signs that stand for being. He insists 
that he is challenging only a philosophical assumption about conscious 
intention: “In this
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typology, the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its 
place, but from this place it will no longer be able to govern the entire 
scene and the entire system of utterances” (1982:326). One gain is that 
this position enables deconstruction to analyze unconscious motivation 
as a basis for some speech acts. For the specter of intention, however, 
deconstruction substitutes the material power of rhetorical fi gures and 
tropes. Logos dominates and even subverts ethos and pathos. Elocutio 
becomes the focus of rhetoric. Its differing, deferring, and dispersive 
character fi nally displaces the functions of voice and address.
In its historical development Renaisssance rhetoric similarly 
narrows its focus to elocutio, the search for fi gures and tropes in verbal 
expression. Inventio and dispositio become adjuncts of logic and 
dialectic whose proper function is to formulate ideas. Rhetoric attends 
wholly to verbal style. It schematizes fi gures and tropes, the devices of 
style that supplement thought rather than serve as a medium through 
which thought lives. Ramistic studies of rhetoric offer long inventories 
of elocutionary devices, fi gures of words and of thought that enhance 
style. Attention to voice and address disappears, all the more so since 
their uses, unlike those of schemes and tropes, admit of no logical limit. 
Major examples of Ramist rhetoric that have served literary criticism 
since the Renaissance include Abraham France’s Arcadian Rhetoric 
(1588), Du Marsais’ Des Tropes (1730), and Pierre Fontanier’s Manuel 
classique (1818).
The twentieth-century counterpart of rhetorical taxonomies 
is Groupe μ’s Rhétorique générale, the most ambitious structuralist 
rhetoric of our time. Groupe μ seeks to free our understanding of rhetoric 
from contingent contexts by distinguishing among universal types of 
schemes and tropes, fi nally relegating voice and address to the behavioral 
infl ections of a pre-determined code. Deconstruction reacts against such 
a code by bracketing its assumptions about voice and address.
Jacques Derrida argues specifi cally against them when he 
criticizes Husserl’s search for the metaphysical foundations of 
knowledge. Derrida begins by questioning Husserl’s intuition about the 
presence of voice to itself: “Consciousness owes its privileged status. . . 
to the possibility of a living vocal medium [la vive voix]” (1973:15). He 
asserts that traditional philosophy has used a metaphor of “the unity of 
thought and voice in logos” (74) to confi rm its principles of self-identity 
and continuity. This use, “taking auto-affection as the exercise of the 
voice” (82), entails a
224 WILLIAM J. KENNEDY
metaphysical assumption that begs the question of presence and its 
privileged status. To overcome this assumption, Derrida disrupts it: 
“Shall we say that the auto-affection we have been talking about up until 
now concerns only the operation of the voice? . . . This pure spontaneity 
is [only] an impression” (83-84).
Clearly Derrida is subverting only the philosophical identity 
of voice with thought and presence, yet he subverts it with important 
consequences for rhetoric and literary theory. By calling all these terms 
into question, Derrida undermines their usefulness in his broader critical 
vocabulary. Even though he repeatedly reclaims them for rhetorical and 
literary analyses, he nonetheless discloses their theoretical complicity 
with other ungrounded metaphysical assumptions. More specifi cally, 
he accords a newly privileged status to their opposites, silence and 
absence. His critique of Husserl comes full circle. Derrida himself 
makes an ungrounded metaphysical assumption in according absence 
equal status with presence, silence with voice. By denying one’s 
privilege over the other, he in fact begs the question of absence, of 
non-identity, and of discontinuity. When he designates iterability as 
the structure of communication, he makes the absence of intention a 
necessary entailment: “Given this structure of iteration, the intention 
which animates utterance will never be completely present in itself 
and its content” (1982:326). In this context there is simply no
philosophical means of denying or affi rming metaphysical 
assumptions about presence or absence. Nor are there any
rhetorical means.
Traditional rhetoric, however, assumes neither presence nor 
absence in voice and address. It instead construes them as heuristic 
devices. Rhetorical voice may resemble the living human voice, but it 
nowhere presumes to supplant the latter. Its function is wholly mediatory: 
it lends form to the speaker’s discourse. Likewise rhetorical address need 
not presume a living audience present in time and space. By heuristically 
construing a fi ctive audience, it indeed assumes the opposite. It assumes 
that audiences can suspend their limitations in time and space in order 
to interact with the text. As rhetorical terms, voice and address privilege 
neither presence nor absence because they freely admit both when they 
fulfi ll their heuristic function. As Paul Ricoeur has shown, they provide 
frames for the focus of discourse (1977:83-90).
Though discourse takes many forms, Derrida seeks to valorize
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one form of it as irreducible. For that form he designates writing as the 
becoming absent and unconscious of its subject and referent (1976:69). 
Writing reifi es absence by effacing both author and reference, and it 
displaces signs across time and space in ways that correspond to the 
original condition of the sign. In his philosophy Derrida seeks to clarify 
the logical limits of the relationship between signifi ers and signifi eds. 
He begins with Saussure’s concept of the sign. According to Saussure, 
each sign acquires meaning only through its difference from other signs: 
“In language there are only differences” (1966:120). Derrida carries 
this principle a step further by postulating that as part of the sign a 
signifi er acquires its meaning only through difference from its signifi ed, 
“the thesis of difference as the source of linguistic value” (1976:52). 
This postulate entails a logical fallacy, however, since within the sign 
system signifi ers and signifi eds belong to mutually exclusive orders of 
meaning. Signifi ers certainly differ from other signifi ers: one phoneme 
differs from another and one morpheme differs from another; but the 
signifi eds of various signs do not necessarily differ from each other. 
Two unlike signifi ers may in fact point to the same signifi ed, as happens 
in synonymy and circumlocution. Signifi ers operate on an entirely 
separate level from their signifi eds.
Derrida tries to overcome the breach by asserting that the 
signifi er’s difference from the signifi ed constitutes a necessary 
condition of its meaning: “Nothing, neither among the elements nor 
within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are 
only everywhere differences and traces of traces” (1981b:26). No real 
connection prevails between signifi ers and what they refer to. All words 
are buried metaphors. They relate neither to reality nor to a personal 
understanding of reality, but rather to a series of displaced meanings. 
They are common coin, public property that belong alike to all and 
cannot be appropriated by any single person or voice.
If Derrida’s displacement of voice and address evokes Ramus’ 
reduction of rhetoric to elocutio, there is a good reason why it does. Both 
operationally distrust the dynamics of a subtext, Ramus because print 
technology occludes it, Derrida because the text is so full that there is 
nothing outside the text. Both also distrust metaphor, yet both conceive 
of it as a rhetorical necessity because for each rhetoric is primarily a 
system of fi gures and tropes. As pure supplement it adds itself to already 
signifi cant language and defers it in a necessarily indefi nite process 
(Derrida
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1976:141, 275). Yet the rhetorical construction always comes to 
obliterate itself, endlessly affording grounds for its own deconstruction. 
It represents a moment of detour in which truth can be lost the very 
instant it is gained (Derrida 1982:241).
The result is an endorsement of interminable rhetorical analysis, 
a déformation professionnelle that appeals to literary theorists of 
various stripes and has certainly gained much ground in the 1970s and 
1980s. At the root of this interminability, however, is a faulty defi nition 
of metaphor as a deviation from literal meaning. As Paul Ricoeur has 
shown, metaphor is not a negative deviation from meaning, but rather 
a positive interaction and fulfi llment of many richly textured meanings. 
The startling effect of a momentary deviation gives way to fuller 
signifi cance. The referent emerges on a higher level of meaning (Ricoeur 
1977:147-56). Derrida nonetheless privileges a negative metaphorics of 
deviation. Metaphor “risks disrupting the semantic plenitude to which 
it should belong. Marking the moment of the turn or of the detour [du 
tour ou du détour] during which meaning might seem to venture forth 
alone, unloosed from the very thing it aims at however, from the truth 
which attunes it to its referent, metaphor also opens the wandering of the 
semantic” (1982:241). He then announces a deconstruction that replaces 
the binary simplicities of Ramistic analysis with the opaque antinomies 
of an unsettled, forever self-questioning analysis. Literary theory that 
adopts this approach pursues an enormously subtle and often productive 
program for rhetorical analysis, but it also surrenders its commitment 
to rhetoric as an instrument of insight or discovery. In deconstructive 
theory each gain bows to a succeeding one that inevitably contradicts 
it. 
As literary theorists ought to recognize, language is not just 
extensional, referring to something outside itself. It is also intentional, 
stemming from a consciousness that knows and wills. In a philosophical 
study that has important implications for rhetoric and literary theory, 
John Searle shows that intention constitutes a state of mind or attitude 
rather than a conscious act, thereby accommodating both conscious and 
unconscious intentions: “One can represent something as being the case 
even when one believes that it isn’t the case (a lie); even when one 
believes that it is the case, but it isn’t (a mistake); and even if one is not 
interested in convincing anybody that it is the case” (1983:169). If it 
were otherwise, the rhetorical or literary critic might be able to
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deny material intentionality in a text by arguing that the author never 
declared such a conscious intention. Instead, because it is a state of mind 
or attitude, one must take account of its relational properties. These 
properties derive from the circumstances of the utterance. They involve 
the character of the speaker, the nature of his or her knowledge and will, 
the composition of the audience, and the speaker’s interaction with the 
audience registered in various forms of voice and address. Voice and 
address convey these intentional properties, and they constitute a frame 
that powerfully modifi es both the speaker’s and the audience’s focus on 
language and meaning.
We might conclude with Nietzsche. Deconstructive theorists 
have referred with great enthusiasm to his fragmentary and until recently 
unpublished “Notes for a Course on Rhetoric.” There Nietzsche asserts 
that all language is inherently fi gurative: “Tropes do not supervene upon 
words but are rather their proper nature: one cannot speak absolutely 
of a proper signifi cation” (1971:113). Deconstructive theory stops with 
that formulation. Paul de Man, for example, concludes his discussion 
of Nietzsche by asserting that “rhetoric is a text in that it allows for two 
incompatible, mutually self-destructive points of view, and therefore puts 
an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any reading or understanding” 
(1979:131). Nietzsche, however, continues with a clear endorsement of 
voice and address as mutually interfacing components of a dialogue. 
The speaker projects his or her voice through a poetic persona: “His art 
is one of imitation: he speaks as an actor speaks for another person or 
cause that is outside himself” (1971:117). Speech implies not only the 
existence of another to whom the speech is addressed, but also that the 
speaker has a kind of otherness within himself or herself. The speaker’s 
voice is always a fi ction that allows the speaker to address another in the 
sympathetic awareness of what it means to be an other.
As with the speaker’s voice, so with the audience that the speaker 
addresses. Speakers and audiences together enter the discursive fi eld 
as makers, shapers, formers, and transformers of meaning. Walter Ong 
has memorably shown that “the writer’s audience is always a fi ction” 
(1977:53-81). To designate both speaker and audience as fi ctive, 
however, does not deny their concrete existential reality, nor does it 
abrogate the intentionality of the producing speaker or writer. On the 
contrary, it reinforces their reality as particular components of rhetorical 
expression while
228 WILLIAM J. KENNEDY
it confi rms the intentionality of the producing agent. In writing as in 
speech the audience participates in a rhetorical contest with the producing 
agent. The latter’s chief advantage is his or her rhetorical mode of voice 
and address. Only at their own peril do rhetorical criticism and literary 
theory ignore them.
Cornell University 
References
Agricola 1479
Rudolph Agricola. De inventions dialectics libri tres. Louvain, 1528. Reprint ed. 
Wilhellm Risse. Hildesheim: George Olms Verlag, 1976.
Butler 1920—22
H. E. Butler, trans. Quintilian. Institutio oratorio. Loeb Classical Library. 4 vols. 
London: Heinemann.
Campbell 1963
George Campbell. Philosophy of Rhetoric. Ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer. Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press.
Caplan 1954
Harry Caplan, trans. Rhetorica ad herennium. Loeb Classical Library. London: 
Heinemann.
Croce 1909
Benedetto Croce. Aesthetic. Trans. Douglas Ainslie. New York: Macmillan.
de Man 1979
Paul de Man. Allegories of Reading. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Derrida 1973
Jacques Derrida. La Voix et le phénomène. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1967. English translation: Speech and Phenomena. Trans. David B. Allison. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press.
Derrida 1976
__________. De la grammatologie. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967. English 
translation: Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press.
Derrida 1981a
__________. La Dissémination. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972. English translation: 
Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Derrida 1981b
__________. Positions. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1972. English translation: Positions. 
Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 “VOICE” AND “ADDRESS” IN LITERARY THEORY 229
Derrida 1982
__________. Marges de la philosophie. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1972. English 
translation: Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Freese 1926
John Henry Freese, ed. and trans. Aristotle. The “Art” of Rhetoric. Loeb Classical 
Library. London: Heinemann.
Fyfe 1927
W. Hamilton Fyfe, trans. Aristotle, The Poetics; Longinus, On the Sublime; Demetrius, 
On Style. Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann.
George 1538
George of Trebizond. Rhetoricorum libri V. Paris: Joannes Roigny.
Groupe μ 1981
Groupe μ: Jacques Dubois et al. Rhétorique générale. Paris: Larousse, 1970. English 
translation: A General Rhetoric. Trans. Paul Burrell and Edgar Slotkin. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press.
Hamilton and Cairns 1961
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds. Plato. Collected Dialogues. New York: 
Pantheon.
Kennedy 1978
William J. Kennedy. Rhetorical Norms in Renaissance Literature. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
King and Rix 1963
Donald B. King and H. David Rix, trans. Desiderius Erasmus. On Copia of Words and 
Ideas. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Nietzsche 1971
Friedrich Nietzsche. “Cours sur la rhétorique.” Trans. Jean-Luc Nancy. Poétique, 
5:99-142.
Nietzsche 1967
__________. The Birth of Tragedy. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage 
Books.
Ong 1958
Walter J. Ong, S.J. Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Ong 1962
__________. The Barbarian Within. New York: Macmillan.
Ong 1977
__________. Interfaces of the Word. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Ramus 1543
Petrus Ramus. Dialecticae Institutiones. Paris: Jacobus Bogardus. Reprint ed. Wilhelm 
Risse. Stuttgart: Friedrich Frogman Verlag, 1964.
Ricoeur 1977
Paul Ricoeur. La métaphore vive. Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1975. English translation: 
The Rule of Metaphor. Trans. Robert Cerny. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Saussure 1966
Ferdinand de Saussure. Cours de linguistique générale. Ed. Tullio de
230 WILLIAM J. KENNEDY
Mauro. Paris: Payot, 1972. English translation: Course in General Linguistics. Trans. 
Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Searle 1983
John Searle. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stanislavski 1949
Constantin Stanislavski. Building a Character. Trans. Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood. 
New York: Theater Arts Books.
Vološinov 1976
V. N. Vološinov. “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art.” In Freudianism: A Marxist 
Critique. Trans. I. R. Titunik and ed. Neal Brass. New York: Academic Press. pp. 
101-16.
